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Abstract
We consider a two-sided matching problem with a defined notion of pairwise stability. We propose
a distributed blind matching algorithm (BLMA) to solve the problem. We prove the solution produced
by BLMA will converge to an -pairwise stable outcome with probability one. We then consider a
matching problem in cognitive radio networks. Secondary users (SUs) are allowed access time to the
spectrum belonging to the primary users (PUs) provided that they relay primary messages. We propose
a realization of the BLMA to produce an -pairwise stable solution assuming quasi-convex and quasi-
concave utilities. In the case of more general utility forms, we show another BLMA realization to provide
a stable solution. Furthermore, we propose negotiation mechanism to bias the algorithm towards one
side of the market. We use this mechanism to protect the exclusive rights of the PUs to the spectrum.
In all such implementations of the BLMA, we impose a limited information exchange in the network
so that agents can only calculate their own utilities, but no information is available about the utilities
of any other users in the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
The assignment game is a model for a two-sided matching market with transferable linear
utilities [1]. Shapley and Shubik first formulated this game in coalitional form in a housing
market. The outcome of the game is an assignment of prices to homes together with a feasible
allocation of homes to buyers (a matching) [2]. In this (linear) assignment game model, utility
transfers occur at a one-to-one rate from one player to any other [3]. In the case of general
nonlinear utilities, different agents’ utilities are not measured in the same units. This induces
another class of games called the generalized assignment game [4].
An important solution concept in such games is pairwise stability. Pairwise stable vectors are
payoff vectors that cannot be improved upon by any pair of players. Shapley and Shubik showed
that there always exists pairwise stable solutions in the assignment game and they coincide with
the core of the game [5].
ar
X
iv
:1
60
5.
00
30
6v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
 M
ay
 20
16
2In this paper, we begin by formulating a context-free matching problem1. In our model, agents
maintain aspiration levels which are an abstraction of their potential utility from a match. We
provide a mechanism where these aspiration levels go up when agents’ search for a match
is fruitful and they go down otherwise. We demonstrate that our model is general enough to
encompass the linear and generalized assignment game frameworks. Our solution concept is a
modified notion of pairwise stability such that the payoff vectors, the aspiration levels, cannot
be -improved upon by any pair of players. After defining our problem, we propose a blind
matching algorithm (BLMA) to produce a matching accompanied by vectors of aspiration levels
in the two-sided matching problem. We show that the BLMA will converge to our defined notion
of pairwise stability with probability one.
In its abstract form, the proposed BLMA does not specify how agents negotiate their way into
a matching. Neither does the algorithm specify how agents eventually update their aspirations
if they match. The algorithm also does not specify how much information agents know about
each other’s aspiration levels. All that is required for assured convergence is that agents have a
mechanism of knowing if they have agreeable matches and if there exists such agreement of two
agents’ aspirations, that their match occurs with positive probability. It is in that sense that the
algorithm is both blind and non-deterministic as the details of all the aforementioned concerns
are left to the specific context of the matching problem.
Next, considering the context of cooperative spectrum sharing in cognitive radios, we formulate
a matching problem where secondary users (SUs) relay primary user (PU) data in exchange for
spectrum access time. Agents’ utilities are finite but non-linear in the time and power resources.
Furthermore, the PU’s utility is quasi-convex while the SU’s utility is quasi-concave2. The desired
outcome is a matching of the PUs and the SUs and a specification of a set of -pairwise stable
utilities. In this specific context, exploiting the quasi-convexity property, we provide a negotiation
mechanism that randomly splits the time and power resources among any two agents. Because
such mechanism is only a specific realization of the BLMA, we are assured convergence to a
matching with -pairwise stable utilities.
We then relax our assumptions further and modify the cooperative relaying mechanism so that
agents’ utilities are no longer quasi-convex 3. In this case, we propose a different negotiation
1As argued in [5], the main difference between marriage problems (or matching problems) and assignment games is that
agents in the former have ordinal preferences over agents on the opposite side of the market and thus this game is said to be
a nontransferable utility (NTU) cooperative game, while in linear assignment games, on the other hand, agents have cardinal
utilities which they can transfer to agents on the other side of the market. Such games are called transferable utility (TU)
cooperative games. Assignment games with non-linear utilities, however, fall under the class of NTU games since different
agents’ utilities are not measured in the same units and are therefore non-transferable [2], [6]. Bearing all this in mind, we will
thereafter refer to our problem, which encompasses both linear and generalized assignment games, as a matching problem.
2Where clear and for convenience, we will thereafter use the term quasi-convex to refer to both the quasi-convex and quasi-
concave properties.
3In this modified setting, agents on the two sides of the market will still show opposite trends in the time and power resources.
3mechanism where agents flip a coin to decide whether to optimize the power or time resource
while maintaining all other previous agreements. This simple decision process of working one
dimension at a time can also be shown to be another specific negotiation mechanism for the
BLMA. Hence, we show convergence to pairwise stable solutions despite the lack of quasi-
convexity. In all such negotiation mechanisms, matched users update their aspiration levels by
randomly selecting a point in their agreement set.
Finally we make an observation that restricting the time component of the agents offers to
small values, is an effective mechanism to bias the matching outcome towards one side of the
market, the PUs in our case. This provides a simple scheme to protect PU’s rights to the wireless
spectrum. Since the search space is also significantly reduced, faster convergence comes as a
bonus.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related literature on
matching markets and applications of matching theory to cognitive radio networks. Section III
introduces the context-free matching problem, the proposed BLMA and proof of convergence.
Section IV considers an application of the BLMA to cognitive radio networks assuming quasi-
convex utilities. Section V presents another application for the BLMA for general nonlinear
utilities. Section VI presents some numerical examples to illustrate our results and to compare
with existing work in the literature. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
A. Related Work in Matching Theory
Starting with two models, the marriage problem [7] and the assignment game [1], the study of
stable matchings has evolved into a solid theory with applications in many areas [6]. The effective
coalitions in these games are two-player coalitions [8]. The outcome of the assignment game is
a specification of utilities to agents together with a matching such that every agent receives his
most preferred match at the announced utilities [2]. In the linear model in [1], generally, only
one optimal matching exists that maximizes the sum of the utilities, and it is compatible with
infinitely-many stable payoffs. In the model with general nonlinear utilities, first described by
Demange and Gale in [9], social welfare (i.e. maximizing the sum of the utilities) is not well
defined since different agents’ utilities are not measured in the same units. In this case, possibly
several optimal matchings exist [4].
Numerous techniques exist on finding equilibrium, i.e. a matching supported by a stable payoff,
in linear assignment games under various information assumptions [5], [10], [11]. Of particular
interest to us is the work of Nax and Pradelski in [5]. This work proposed a decentralized
algorithm to find a pairwise stable solution in the linear assignment game involving matching
4workers and firms. The authors considered a limited information scenario so that market partic-
ipants know nothing about other players’ utilities, nor can they deduce such information from
prior rounds of play. Agents have aspiration levels that they adjust from time to time based
on their experienced payoffs. The algorithm proceeds by making random encounters between
agents on both sides of the market. Agents then make offers to each other compatible with their
current aspirations. If they both find their offers profitable, they match; otherwise they return to
their old match or lower their aspirations if they were single. This dynamic learning algorithm
is shown to converge to pairwise stable solutions in finite time with probability one.
Building on this idea, we consider a similar dynamic for our matching problem which en-
compasses both the linear and non-linear utility cases and show that this dynamic converges
to stable solutions with probability one. In addition to the generalized nature of our matching
formulation, our problem is enriched by the presence of many degrees of freedom that control
the value of the utility4. This feature also enlarges the search space for pairwise stable solutions.
We show however that such issues can be significantly suppressed by carefully designing the
agents’ negotiation mechanisms.
B. Application of Matching theory in Cognitive Radio Networks
In addition to the recent publication of [12], a growing body of literature is using matching
theory to solve resource allocation problems in wireless communications, e.g. see [12] for a
comprehensive literature review, [13] for a tutorial, and [14]–[17] and the references therein for
various applications of matching theory to wireless networks.
The closest work to ours is [14] where the scenario of multiple PUs and SUs is considered.
SUs use part of their power to relay the PU messages in exchange for spectrum access time. The
problem formulation permits the classification of SUs based on their so called type information,
which is a compact representation of an SU’s private information such as transmitter power,
sensitivity to power consumption, and SU’s transmitter to PU’s receiver channel gain. The paper
proposes a distributed algorithm to solve the matching problem under two assumptions on the
available information. In the partially incomplete information scenario, PUs have knowledge of
the types of all SUs connected to them, while in the incomplete information scenario, a PU
knows the set of SUs’ types connected to itself, but does not know the exact type of each SU.
Note that knowledge of type information permits a PU to know the utility of an SU for a given
time and power allocation. The paper then compares the performance of the two distributed
algorithms in terms of PUs’ and SUs’ utilities.
4There are as many degrees of freedom as there are resources.
5We consider a similar setting to [14] where SUs relay PU data in exchange for spectrum access
time. However, we adopt less restrictive information assumptions. In our formulation, agents,
whether PUs or SUs, have enough information to calculate their own utilities. No knowledge
is available about the utilities of other users, whether on the same side or the opposite side of
the market. The functional form of the utility of the SUs in our application does not permit
type classification and we will show that such information will not be needed to reach desired
solutions.
III. CONTEXT-FREE BLMA ALGORITHM
A. Setup
We consider a two-sided matching problem constructed as follows. There are two disjoint sets
of agents, K = {1, 2, ..., K} and L = {1, 2, ..., L}, that form two sides of a matching market.
We exclusively will use k and ` to denote a representative element of K and L, respectively,
and sometimes use j to denote a representative element of K ∪ L.
Definition 1: A matching is a mapping
µ : K ∪ L → K ∪ L ∪ {∅}
such that for any k ∈ K and ` ∈ L:
• µ(k) ∈ L ∪ {∅}.
• µ(`) ∈ K ∪ {∅}.
• ` = µ(k)⇔ k = µ(`).
If ` = µ(k), then k and ` are said to be matched. In our model, an agent can be matched to at
most one agent on the opposite side of the market. If µ(j) = ∅, then agent j ∈ K∪L is said to
be single.
A matching, µ, can be characterized by a K × L matrix, Mµ, with elements in {0, 1}, such
that
Mµ(k, `) =
{
1, µ(k) = `;
0, otherwise.
Let M denote the set of all feasible matching matrices induced by some matching, µ. For any
M ∈M, let µM denote the matching consistent with M.
In order to describe the preferences of agents, we introduce aspiration levels that abstractly
represent the potential utility to be derived from a match. If ak is the aspiration level of agent
k ∈ K and b` is the aspiration level of agent ` ∈ L, then agents k and ` are willing to be matched
if the matching can produce utilities of at least ak and b`, respectively.
More formally, we introduce the notion of an agreement function as follows.
6Definition 2: An agreement function is a mapping
A : R+ × R+ → {0, 1}
such that
1) If A(a, b) = 0, then A(a′, b′) = 0 for all a′ ≥ a and b′ ≥ b.
2) There exists a γ > 0 such that A(a, b) = 0 if a ≥ γ or b ≥ γ.
We associate A(a, b) = 1 to mean that the aspiration levels a and b are agreeable. Accordingly,
condition 1 defines a monotonicity property for aspiration levels: once aspirations are not
agreeable, further increases in aspiration levels also are not agreeable. Condition 2 defines a
boundedness property for agreeable aspiration levels.
Definition 3: A matching problem is a collection of agreement functions, Ak`, indexed by
k ∈ K and ` ∈ L.
We are interested in defining the notion of a stable outcome of a matching problem specified
by a set of agreement functions. Towards this end, we will consider vectors of aspiration levels
a ∈ RK+ and b ∈ RL+, with elements denoted by ak and b`, respectively. In the same way that
j denotes a representative element of K ∪ L, we will use cj to denote the associated aspiration
level.
The specific stability notion of interest here will be -pairwise stability defined as follows.
Definition 4: For  > 0, the matching µ and aspiration levels a and b form an -pairwise
stable solution to a matching problem if:
1) For all (k, `) such that ` = µ(k),
Ak`(ak, b`) = 1.
2) For all (k, `),
Ak`(ak + , b` + ) = 0.
3) For all j ∈ K ∪ L with µ(j) = ∅, cj = 0.
In words, condition 1 states that aspiration levels between matched pairs are agreeable. Condition
2 implies that no pair of agents have agreeable -improvement aspiration levels. Note that
condition 2 also applies to agents that are matched (i.e., even if ` = µ(k)). Condition 3 implies
that single agents must have zero aspiration levels at an -pairwise stable solution.
Here are two examples of matching problems using the above formulation.
• Matching market with transferable utility: The sets K and L represent firms and workers.
For each pair, k ∈ K and ` ∈ L, the value pk` is the maximum salary firm k is willing to
pay worker `. Similarly, qk` is the minimum salary worker ` is willing to take to work for
7firm k. Suppose firm k has aspiration level ak and worker ` has aspiration level b`. Then
a match is agreeable if Ak`(ak, b`) = 1, where
Ak`(ak, b`) =
{
1, pk` − ak ≥ qk` + b`;
0, otherwise.
The agreement function Ak` is fully characterized by parameters pk` and qk`.
• Matching market with non-transferable utility: There are two commodities, G and H . An
agent k ∈ K has an initial endowment of gk > 0 of commodity G, whereas an agent ` ∈ L
has an initial endowment of h` > 0 of commodity H . Every agent k ∈ K has an indexed
collection of utility functions,
uk`(g, h) : R+ × R+ → R
that expresses how much it values g of its own commodity G with h of commodity H
from agent `. Likewise, every agent ` ∈ L has an indexed collection of utility functions,
vk`(g, h) : R+ × R+ → R
that expresses how much it values h of its own commodity H with g of commodity G
from agent k. We assume that all utility functions are strictly increasing in both arguments.
Suppose agent k has aspiration level ak and agent ` has aspiration level b`. Define the set
Sk`(ak, b`) = {(g, h) | g ≤ gk;h ≤ h`;uk`(gk − g, h) ≥ ak; vk`(g, h` − h) ≥ b`} . (1)
In words, this set describes all possible exchanges of g from agent k to agent ` in return
for h from agent ` to agent k such that their utilities meet the specified aspiration levels.
Then a match is agreeable if Ak`(ak, b`) = 1, where
A(ak, b`) =
{
1, Sk`(ak, b`) 6= {∅};
0, otherwise.
(2)
B. BLMA Algorithm
We now present an algorithm that leads to an -pairwise stable solution. The algorithm is
inspired by the recent work of [5] on transferable utility assignment games.
Informally, the algorithm proceeds as follows:
• Aspirations levels, a(t) and b(t), as well as a matchings characterized by a matching
matrix, M(t), evolve over stages t = 0, 1, 2, ....
• At stage t, a pair of agents, (k, `), are activated at random.
• If the increased aspiration levels ak(t) +  and b`(t) +  are agreeable, i.e.,
Ak`(ak(t) + , b`(t) + ) = 1,
8then agents k and ` become matched with a positive probability η and break previous
matches, if any. The new aspiration levels ak(t + 1) and bk(t + 1), as well as matching
matrix, M(t+ 1), are updated accordingly.
• If the increased aspiration levels ak(t) +  and b`(t) +  are not agreeable, i.e.,
Ak`(ak(t) + , b`(t) + ) = 0,
then
◦ The matching matrix remains unchanged, i.e., M(t+ 1) =M(t).
◦ If either agent k or ` is single, then that agent reduces its aspiration by δ, and the
new aspiration levels ak(t+ 1) and/or b`(t+ 1) are updated accordingly.
Algorithm 1 presents pseudocode for the Blind Matching Algorithm (BLMA). Here, the
aforementioned “stages” are executions of the main loop. The time indexing of t = 0, 1, 2, ... is
suppressed for clarity of presentation. The notation “RAND[0, 1]” (Line 5) means an i.i.d. sample
of a uniformly distributed random variable over the interval [0, 1]. Also [x]+ = max(0, x) (Line
16).
BLMA is “blind” in the sense that potential matches between agents k and ` are outcomes of
bilateral negotiations that only depend on the agreement function Ak`. The negotiation process
is abstracted through the randomized outcome determined by RAND[0, 1] ≥ η. An agent need
not know the details behind another agent’s acceptance or rejection. Furthermore, since such
outcomes can be randomized, it may be difficult to make deterministic conclusions from a
rejected offer. The main point is that all such issues are suppressed, with the specifics to depend
on the actual context. Also, BLMA is non-deterministic in that revised aspiration levels (Lines
9–11) are not fully specified. Again, how this selection actually occurs will depend on the specific
context.
We now state the main result.
Theorem 1: From any initial a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, and M = 0, the matching, µM, and aspiration
levels, a and b, converge to an -pairwise stable matching with probability one.
C. Proof
This subsection is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1. We first introduce some specialized
notation and terminology.
We will use z to denote the state of the algorithm. A state is a triplet
z ∈ RK+ × RL+ ×M,
9Algorithm 1 BLMA
Require:  > δ > 0 and η ∈ (0, 1].
1: Initialize a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, M = 0.
2: loop
3: Activate a pair of agents uniformly at random, (k, `) ∈ K × L.
4: if Akl(ak + , b` + ) = 1 then
5: if RAND[0, 1] ≥ η then
6: M(k, `)← 1
7: M(k, `′)← 0,∀`′ 6= `
8: M(k′, `)← 0,∀k′ 6= k
9: Select arbitrary a′ ≥ ak +  and b′ ≥ b` +  such that Ak`(a′, b′) = 1.
10: ak ← a′
11: b` ← b′
12: end if
13: else
14: for j ∈ {k, `} do
15: if µM(j) = ∅, then
16: cj ← [cj − δ]+
17: end if
18: end for
19: end if
20: end loop
which is a combination of aspiration levels and a matching matrix. Each execution of the main
loop results in an update in the state, e.g., z ← znew. A state is reachable if it can be realized in
a finite number of main loop executions.
A state, z = (a,b,M), will be called pre-stable if
1) For all (k, `) such that ` = µ(k),
Ak`(ak, b`) = 1.
2) For all (k, `),
Ak`(ak + , b` + ) = 0.
Strictly speaking, this definition depends on  and accordingly could be called -pre-stable. We
will suppress this dependence for clarity of presentation.
Note that the conditions for a pre-stable state are the first two conditions for an -pairwise
stable state. The only distinction is that a pre-stable state may have single agents with non-zero
aspiration levels.
Claim 1: From any reachable state, z, there exists a finite sequence of admissible transitions
to a state, z′, that is pre-stable.
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Proof: In the main loop, activate and match any pair of agents (k, `) with
Akl(ak + , b` + ) = 1.
Continue to do so until there are no remaining such pairs. This process must terminate because
of the boundedness property of agreement functions and the algorithmic property that, in such
a sequence, no agents are reducing their aspiration levels. Upon termination, the resulting state,
z′, must be pre-stable by construction.
Given any state z = (a,b,M), let SNZ(z) denote the set of all single agents with non-zero
aspiration levels, i.e.,
SNZ(z) = {j ∈ K ∪ L | (i) µ(j) = ∅, (ii) cj > 0} .
A pre-stable state, z, is called tight for any agent j∗ ∈ SNZ(z) with aspiration level cj∗ , if
the new state, z′ = (a′,b′,M′), defined by:
M′ =M
c′j =
{
cj, j 6= j∗;
[cj − δ]+, j = j∗,
is not pre-stable. The implication here is that a state, z, is pre-stable and tight if (i) there are
no -improvement agreeable matches at current aspirations levels, but (ii) there will exist an
-improvement agreeable match after any agent in SNZ(z) lowers its aspiration level by δ.
Claim 2: From any pre-stable state, z, there exists a finite sequence of admissible transitions
to a state, z′, that is either (i) pre-stable and tight or (ii) -pairwise stable.
Proof: Let z be a pre-stable state. If SNZ(z) is empty, then z is already -pairwise stable.
Otherwise, select an arbitrary j∗ ∈ SNZ(z). In the main loop, let j∗ be activated with a matched
agent. Since z is pre-stable, the proposed match is not -improvement agreeable, and so the
new match is not accepted. Accordingly, the aspiration level cj∗ is reduced by δ. Repeat this
sequence with the same agent j∗ until either cj∗ is within a single δ reduction of admitting an
-improvement match (with some unspecified agent) or cj∗ = 0. Let z+ be the resulting state.
The only difference between z and z+ is in the aspiration level of j∗. Now select a different
j∗∗ ∈ SNZ(z) and repeat accordingly. Upon visiting all of the agents in SNZ(z), the resulting
state z′ is pre-stable and tight by construction.
Claim 3: From any pre-stable and tight state, z, with |SNZ(z)| 6= 0, there exists a finite
sequence of admissible transitions to a pre-stable state z′ with |SNZ(z′)| < |SNZ(z)|, i.e., a
strict reduction in the number of single agents with non-zero aspiration levels.
Proof: Let z be a state that is pre-stable and tight. Let us assume without loss of generality
that there exists a k∗ ∈ SNZ(z), i.e., some agent in K is single with non-zero aspiration levels.
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(Analogous arguments hold if the selected agent is in L.) Let us call k∗ the token holding agent.
The token will not be released until a new state, z′, is reached with the desired reduction in
cardinality.
Activate (the token holding) k∗ with any matched agent ` ∈ L. Since z is pre-stable, a new
match does not occur, and the state is updated so that agent k∗ has an aspiration level of ak∗−δ.5
Furthermore, since z was tight, there exists an agent `∗ for which
Ak∗`∗(ak∗ − δ + , b`∗ + ) = 1.
Let the match between k∗ and `∗ occur. There are three possible scenarios:
• Scenario A. `∗ ∈ SNZ(z): Agent `∗ was also single with non-zero aspiration. Let z+ denote
the resulting state, and a+k∗ and b
+
`∗ be the revised aspiration levels of agents k
∗ and `∗,
respectively. Then
a+k∗ ≥ ak∗ − δ + ,
b+`∗ ≥ b`∗ + .
Furthermore, since  > δ, the aspiration levels of z+ are greater than the aspiration levels
of z. Accordingly, z+ is pre-stable. Now apply the procedure of Claim 2 to produce a state
z′ that is pre-stable and tight. By construction, the number of single agents with non-zero
aspiration has been reduced by at least two, i.e.,
|SNZ(z′)| ≤ |SNZ(z)| − 2.
Accordingly, the token is released.
• Scenario B. µ(`∗) = ∅ and b`∗ = 0: Agent `∗ is also single, but with zero aspiration level.
Proceed in a similar manner to Scenario A to construct a state z′ where the number of
single agents with non-zero aspiration has been reduced by at least one, i.e.,
|SNZ(z′)| ≤ |SNZ(z)| − 1.
Accordingly, the token is released.
• Scenario C. µ(`∗) = k∗∗: Agent `∗ is matched to another agent, namely k∗∗, on the K side
of the market. Increase the aspiration levels of newly matched agents k∗ and `∗ as required.
Furthermore, reassign the token to the newly single agent, k∗∗. Note that at this stage, the
number of single agents with non-zero aspiration levels has not changed, and hence the
token has not been released, but rather reassigned. The new state would be pre-stable and
tight except for the aspiration level of the new token holding agent, k∗∗. Accordingly,
5Here, we assume for convenience that ak∗ − δ > 0. Similar arguments hold in case [ak∗ − δ]+ = 0.
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through a series of executions of the main loop, reduce the aspiration level of k∗∗ until
either ck∗∗ = 0 or the realized state is pre-stable and tight. In the former case, the number
of single agents with non-zero aspiration levels has been reduced by one, as desired, and
the token is released. In the latter case, since the realized state is pre-stable and tight, one
can now invoke the aforementioned procedures in the proof of Claim 3 while selecting
k∗∗ as the token holding agent (i.e., without reassigning the token). If the outcome is
Scenario A or B, then the number of singe agents with non-zero aspirations levels has
been reduced, and the token is released. Otherwise, the token is passed to yet another
agent, e.g., k∗∗∗, and the process is repeated. Note that whenever the token is reassigned,
it stays on the same side, K, of the market. Furthermore, with each reassignment, the
sum of the aspiration levels of the L side of the market strictly increases. Such increase
cannot continue indefinitely because of the boundedness of the agreement functions, and so
eventually the token must be released with the number of single non-zero agents reduced.
Now apply the procedure of Claim 2 to assure that the exiting state z′ is pre-stable and
tight.
With Claims 1–3 in place, we are now in a position to prove Theorem 1. From any reachable
state, there exists a finite sequence of admissible transitions that leads to a pre-stable state
(Claim 1) followed by a finite sequence of admissible transitions that leads to a pre-stable and
tight state (Claim 2). By a repeated application of Claim 3, there exists a finite sequence of
admissible transitions to an -pairwise stable state.
Fig. 1 illustrates the combined effect of Claims 1–3. A state is first made to be pre-stable and
then pre-stable and tight. At that point, the procedure behind Claim 3 is executed. There are two
types of loops in Figure 1. The first type of loop involves a releasing of the token and a return
to the “Tightening” procedure. This loop results in a reduction in the number of single agents
with non-zero aspiration levels, and so there can only be a finite number of such iterations. The
second type of loop involves a reassignment of the token. In this loop, the number of single
agents with non-zero aspiration levels remains constant. However, this loop results in an increase
in the sum of aspiration levels on one side of the market (namely, on the side opposite to the
token), and so this loop must eventually be exited because of the boundedness assumption on
agreement functions. Ultimately, the process much reach the “End” state, which is -pairwise
stable.
Note that Figure 1 is intended to illustrate a feasible sequence of admissible transitions to an
-pairwise stable state, and as such a positive probability flow of the BLMA algorithm. Putting
all this together, the conclusion is that from any reachable state, there is a positive probability of
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Pre-stabilization
(Claim 1)
Reachable z
Tightening
(Claim 2)
Assign token to
SNZ agent
Match token holder
Scenario
A or B
Scenario
C
Tighten Token
Holder
End
Reassign
Token
(Claim 3)
One-sided increase
in aspirations
Release token
Reduction in
SNZ
Release token
Reduction in
SNZ
ε-pairwise stable z’
Fig. 1. Illustration of the combined effects of Claims 1–3 to transition from any reachable state, z, to an -pairwise stable
state (“End”).
a finite sequence of admissible transitions eventually leading to an -pairwise stable state. Given
the finite cardinality of K and L, and the boundedness property of agreement functions, there
exists some finite number of executions of the main loop, say T , such that from any reachable
state, z, the probability of reaching an -pairwise stable state after T executions of the main loop
is at least p > 0, where both p and T do not depend on z. By the Borel-Cantelli lemma, we can
subsequently conclude that the algorithm reaches an -pairwise stable state with probability one
[18].
IV. APPLICATION: COGNITIVE RADIO MARKET WITH QUASI-CONVEX UTILITIES
In this section, we apply the BLMA to solve a matching problem in cognitive radio networks.
We consider overlay spectrum access in cognitive networks whereby primary users (PUs) allow
secondary users (SUs) access to their spectrum in exchange for some compensation, such as
money or resource [19], [20]. Specifically, we will use cooperative spectrum sharing as one
such dynamic spectrum access technique in which SUs relay traffic for PUs in exchange for
dedicated spectrum access time for their own communication [21]. Previous work also focused
on designing cooperative spectrum access techniques for PUs and SUs (e.g. [12], [14]). We will
adopt the system model of [14] in this section and provide a solution using the BLMA with
significantly less information assumptions.
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Phase 1: PTk
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Phase 3: SUl
communication
Fig. 2. Interaction between PUk and SU` during the three transmission phases.
A. System Model
Consider a cognitive radio network comprised of a set K = {1, 2, ..., K} of PUs and a set
L = {1, 2, ..., L} of SUs. Each network node is made up of a transmitter-receiver pair. The PUs
are the owners of the network, and they control how the spectrum is accessed. The SUs are
opportunistic users that seek possible spectrum access to the PU network with agreed-upon time
and power allocations. Suppose that PUk is matched with SU` with agreed upon time, τk` ∈ [0, 1],
and power, Pk` > 0. The PUk’s time slot, τk, is fixed for cooperative communication while τkl
is the time allocated by PUkl to SU`’s communications. The three phases of communication are
as follows:
• During the first τk
2
part of the time slot, the PU’s transmitter, PTk, broadcasts its data
packet. The data is received by the PU’s receiver, PRk, and by SU’s transmitter, ST`,
contingent on hk` ≥ hk, where hk` is PTk to ST` channel gain, while hk is PTk to PRk
direct link channel gain.
• During the second τk
2
part of the time slot, ST` decodes the data received in phase 1 and
relays PUk’s message to PRk using power Pk`.
• A third time phase, τk`, is allocated by PUk for SU`’s own communication.
The above communication structure is shown in Fig. 2 with the other relevant channel gains.
Once matched, PUk gives up time, τk`, for SU`’s spectrum access, in exchange for relaying help
from SU`. Moreover, SU` uses power, Pk`, for relaying PUk’s message in exchange for spectrum
access.
B. Utility Functions and Matching Problem Formulation
Suppose that specific time and power allocations have been agreed upon by PUk and SU`.
Assuming, without loss of generality, that τk = 1, then the average achievable PUk data rate
over the entire time when matched with SU` is
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RPk`(τk`, Pk`) =
{
1
2(1+τk`)
[
RP,dlk + log2
(
1 + Pk`
σ2
)]
if hk` ≥ hk
0 otherwise,
(3)
where the above rate expression can be achieved using a decode-and-forward protocol with
parallel channel coding [22], [23]. The requirement hk` ≥ hk is the condition that ST` is in the
decoding set of PUk [24]. R
P,dl
k is PUk’s direct link rate which can be calculated as
RP,dlk = log2
(
1 +
Pk|hk|2
σ2
)
, (4)
where Pk is PUk’s transmission power. Equation (3) is comprised of two terms. The first term,
RP,dlk , refers to phase one of the communication, while the second term reflects the rate accrued
due to relaying by SU` in the second communication phase. Then, the associated utility for PUk
when matched with SU` is
uk`(τk`, Pk`) = [R
P
k`(τk`, Pk`)−RP,dlk ]+, (5)
where uk` ≥ 0 reflects the fact that a matching with any SU must at least provide the same
rate as if PUk were single. We note in (3) that the matched SU offers the PU a fixed rate; i.e.
SU` uses power Pk`/|h`k|2 to send PUk’s packets so that the rate enhancement to PUk is kept
constant at 1
2
log2
(
1 + Pk`
σ2
)
.
On the other side, SU` gains utility from the spectrum access opportunity when matched
with PUk, while paying a relaying price, in terms of power used to help the primary link. The
secondary utility can be written as
vk`(τk`, Pk`)=
[
τk` log2
(
1+
P`|h`|2
σ2
)
− c`
(
Pk`
2|hlk|2 + τklP`
)]+
, (6)
where P` is the power used for SU`’s own communication and c` is SU`’s sensitivity for unit
power consumption. We are interested in finding a way to pair the PUs and the SUs with the
appropriate time and power allocations so that no party has an incentive to break the match. We
will cast the problem at hand in the matching problem formulation.
Recall the matching market with non-transferable utility introduced in the previous section.
The two commodities here are time and power. Assume that any PU can allocate a maximum
of τk` ≤ 1 for all ` ∈ L. Given equation (6) and a specified τk` value, the SU can allocate a
maximum power of P k`(τk`). This is the Pk` value which yields zero utility for SU` in (6). Since
we chose to write the utilities in terms of τk`, i.e. the time allotted by PUk` to SUk` and Pk`,
the power granted by SU` to PUk, the set Sk`(ak, b`) in (1) can now be redefined as
Sk`(ak, b`) =
{
(τk`, Pk`) | τk` ≤ 1;Pk` ≤ P k`(τk`);uk`(τk`, Pk`) ≥ ak; vk`(τk`, Pk`) ≥ b`
}
. (7)
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The agreement functions Ak` are defined as in (2) and the matching problem formulation
follows accordingly.
C. BLMA Realization
Since the problem of assigning PUs to SUs with agreed upon time and power allocations is a
matching problem in the sense defined in Section III, we will be able to find an -pairwise stable
matching solution using the BLMA. We will illustrate here the details by which the BLMA will
operate within the cognitive radio context. We note first from (5) that uk` is decreasing in τk`
and increasing in Pk`, while the opposite is true for vk`. Furthermore, we can easily verify the
utility uk` is quasi-convex and the utility vk` is quasi-concave67. Consider the following two
procedures:
1) BLMA1: The PU-SU negotiation process
• Active agents make offers compatible with their aspirations levels.
a) Let PUk pick, uniformly at random, an offer (τPk`, P
P
k`) such that ak +  =
uk`(τ
P
k`, P
P
k`).
b) Let SU` pick, uniformly at random, an offer (τSk`, P
S
k`) such that b` +  =
vk`(τ
S
k`, P
S
k`).
• If
a)
⌊
uk`(τ
S
k`, P
S
k`)
⌋
δ
≥ ak + , and
b)
⌊
vk`(τ
P
k`, P
P
k`)
⌋
δ
≥ b` + 
Then
Ak`(ak + , b` + ) = 1.
End If
2) BLMA1: Updating the aspiration levels
• Select point (τk`, Pk`) uniformly at random on the line segment connecting (τPk`, PPk`)
and (τSk`, P
S
k`).
a) Update ak ←
⌊
uPk`(τk`, Pk`)
⌋
δ
.
b) Update b` ←
⌊
uSk`(τk`, Pk`)
⌋
δ
.
To compare all the forthcoming realizations of the BLMA, we will collectively refer to the above
two procedures as BLMA1. Note that (τPk`, P
P
k`) is the time and power offer of PUk, (τ
S
k`, P
S
k`)
6A function f : K → R over a convex set, K, is quasi-concave (quasi-convex) if super-level (sub-level) sets , {x : f(x) ≥ ρ}
({x : f(x) ≤ ρ}), are convex [25].
7In fact vk` is only linear in tk` and Pk` as can be verified from equation (6) but we use the more general “quasi-concave”
term to emphasize that the modified algorithm will still function under this less-strict assumption.
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is the time and power offer of SU`, and bxcδ = max {mδ | mδ ≤ x for m ∈ Z+}. Considering
the above two procedures, we have the following result:
Proposition 1: Given quasi-convex utility uk` and quasi-concave utility vk` and  = qδ for
some {q | q > 1 and q ∈ Z+}, BLMA1 will converge to an -pairwise stable state with proba-
bility one.
Proof: Read the negotiation process above as Line 4 in the BLMA. PUk with aspira-
tion level ak and SU` with aspiration level b` will only declare their match agreeable when⌊
uk`(τ
S
k`, P
S
k`)
⌋
δ
≥ ak +  = uk`(τPk`, PPk`), and
⌊
vk`(τ
P
k`, P
P
k`)
⌋
δ
≥ b` +  = vk`(τSk`, P Sk`). Read
the aspiration update above as Line 9 in the BLMA. Quasi-convexity of the utilities ensures
that any point on the line segment connecting (τPk`, P
P
k`) and (τ
S
k`, P
S
k`) is agreeable. The revised
aspiration levels will be a+k ≥ ak+  > ak and b+` ≥ b`+  > b` since  > 0. The process cannot
continue indefinitely by the boundedness of the aspiration levels and we will reach a pre-stable
state, hence Claim 1 is established. Fig. 3 provides an illustration8.
Claim 2 is established by Lines 15 and 16 and hence is not changed. Considering a pre-stable
and tight state z, let SU` be any single in SNZ(z) with aspiration b`. Activate SU` with any
agent PUk with aspiration ak. There is no agreement since the state is pre-stable and tight.
Since SU` is single, it lowers its aspiration level by δ. Since the aspirations were tight, we now
have an agreement. The two agents will match with revised aspirations a+k ≥ ak +  > ak and
b+` ≥ b` − δ +  ≥ b` since  > δ > 0. Since the aspiration levels were pre-stable and tight and
agents PUk and SU` increased their aspiration levels, we are again at a pre-stable state. We now
consider the recursive application of Claim 3 coupled with the tightening process of Claim 2 to
reach an -pairwise stable state.
Finally, we make a note that ak, b` ∈ {0, δ, 2δ, ..., γ} by the requirement  = qδ and the
“flooring” procedure of the aspiration update (line 9 in the BLMA). This confinement of the
aspiration levels to the discrete grid of δ steps and the requirement of -improvement agree-
ments ensure that as the algorithm progresses and the aspiration levels pre-stabilize with agents
squeeezing out all available resources that there still exists some η > 0 probability of making
the match (Line 5 in the BLMA).
D. Limited Information Scenario
In this subsection, we motivate our choices for the PU-SU negotiation process and aspiration
level update. Besides quasi-convexity, a careful inspection of the above procedures will reveal
8Although vk` is linear in its variables, we plot SU`’s aspiration contour as being quasi-concave function in Fig. 3 to assert
that BLMA1 will still work for quasi-concave functions also.
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Fig. 3. Figure shows contours for agents’ aspiration levels given equations (5) and (6). An agreement of aspiration levels ak+
and b` +  implies that the b` +  curve must have some segment above the ak +  curve, otherwise ukl(τSk`, P
S
k`) < ak + 
or vkl(τPk`, P
P
k`) < b` + . PUk will choose a random point on this ak +  contour, (τ
P
k`, P
P
k`), as its offer to SU`. SU` will
also choose a random point on its b` +  contour, (τSk`, P
S
k`), as its offer to PUk. The match point (τk`, Pk`) will be chosen at
uniformly at random on the line connecting these two offers.
Time
Power
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direction
Time
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Fig. 4. (a) Information available at PUk given SU`’s offer and (b) Information available at SU` given PUk’s offer. Given the
functional trends for PUk and SU` with time and power, the straight line connecting the two offers guarantees an increase in
utility for both users.
that we have only assumed that agents have all the information needed to calculate their own
utility but no information is available about the utilities of other users on either side of the market.
Fig. 4 illustrates the information users have about each other under the assumption of quasi-
convex utility functions. Given a time and power offer from SU`, PUk only has information of
its aspiration contour ak and SU`’s offer (τSk`, P
S
k`). PUk has no knowledge of any other points on
the b` contour. Points on the line connecting the two offers (τPk`, P
P
k`) and (τ
S
k`, P
S
k`) are agreeable
from PUk’s perspective given the quasi-convexity. A similar statement can be made about SU`.
We contrast this framework, for example, with the work in [14], wherein equation (6) is
normalized and its terms re-arranged so that the SU`’s utility is of the form
valtk` = τk`θk` − Pk`, (8)
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and θk` is a compact representation of SU`’s private information, or so called type, when paired
with PUk. The SU’s type contains information as: 1) The relaying capability of SU` with PUk,
2) the channel coefficients h`k and h`, and 3) SU`’s sensitivity for unit power consumption. The
work in [14] considers two types of limited information scenarios. Under the partially incomplete
information scenario, a PU knows the type of each SU connected to itself, but not to other PUs.
Under the incomplete information scenario, a PU knows the values of all the SU types but has
no way of associating a particular type with a specific SU9. Given the above discussion, it is
clear that we consider a more restrictive incomplete information scenario. It is also in that sense,
that we name our algorithm a blind matching algorithm since very little information is available
about other users in the market, yet we still converge to a stable outcome. We will contrast our
approach with the one in [14] in the numerical results section.
V. BLMA APPLICATION TO A COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORK WITH GENERAL UTILITIES
In this section, we will modify the system model slightly to showcase an application of the
BLMA wherein the utilities of agents on the two sides of the market show opposite trends but
are not necessarily quasi-convex10. We will continue to consider a limited information scenario
so that agents can only calculate their utilities but no information is available about the utilities
of other users in the network. Consider a modified cooperative relaying scheme such that PUk’s
time slot when matched with SU` is now divided as follows:
• During the first τk(1−τk`)
2
part of the time slot, the PU’s transmitter, PTk, broadcasts its
data packet. The data is received by the PU’s receiver, PRk, and by SU’s transmitter, ST`,
contingent on hk` ≥ hk.
• During the second τk(1−τk`)
2
part of the time slot, ST` decodes the data received in phase
1 and relays PUk’s message to PRk using power Pk`.
• A third time phase, τk`τk, is allocated by PUk for SU`’s own communication.
So now PUk’s time slot is fixed at τk and a portion of that time slot is dedicated for SU`’s
communication11. This modification will change the agents’ utilities so that the achievable PUk
rate when matched with SU` is
RPk`(Pk`, τk`) =
{
1−τk`
2
[
RP,dlk + log2
(
1 + Pk`
σ2
)]
if hk` ≥ hk
0 otherwise.
(9)
The associated utility for PUk when matched with SU` will still be calculated as in (5). We will
also modify SU`’s utility so that,
9The authors in [14] do not motivate how such an incomplete information scenario can be realized.
10The realization suggested in this section naturally include the more stringent case of quasi-convex utilities.
11We will thereafter continue to assume τk = 1 w.l.o.g.
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vk`(Pk`, τk`)=τk` log2
(
1+
Pˆk`|h`|2
σ2
)
, (10)
where Pˆk` is the power remaining for SU`’s own communication after relaying for PUk. We will
now include a total energy constraint so that,
1− τk`
2
Pk`
|h`k|2 + τk`Pˆk` = P
T
` , (11)
where PT` is SU`’s total power. We have now accounted for SU`’s total power budget directly
into its achievable rate in (10). We note that the secondary utility form in (10) is no longer
quasi-concave. However uk`(τk`, Pk`) is still decreasing in τk` and increasing in Pk`, while the
opposite is true for for vk`(τk`, Pk`)12. Let us consider another negotiation and aspiration update
process in this context.
A. BLMA2
Similar to the previous section, we can show that the problem of assigning PUs to SUs with the
utility (5) and the modified utility (10) can be formulated as a matching problem. We will now
illustrate the negotiation process and aspiration update details in this context. We will collectively
refer to these two procedures as BLMA2. Previously, because the utilities were quasi-convex,
by connecting the line between the two agents’ offers, we were assured the randomly chosen
matching point provides an improvement for both agents. This is no longer true. However, we
will bypass this difficulty by focusing on one dimension at any given instant while only requiring
the less stringent assumption that the interests of the agents on the two sides of the market are
opposed. Here are the procedures:
1) BLMA2: The PU-SU negotiation process
• Initialize (τkl, Pkl)
• If RAND[0, 1] > 1
2
,
a) Flag= 1.
b) Calculate PPk` such that ak +  = ukl(P
P
k`, τkl),
c) Calculate P Sk` such that b` +  = vkl(P
S
k`, τkl),
Else
12 While it is obvious vk`(τk`, Pk`) is decreasing in Pk`, it is not immediately clear whether it is increasing in τk`. However
taking the derivative of vk`(τk`, Pk`) with respect to τk` yields ∂vk`(τk`,Pk`)∂τk` =
Pk`|h`|2/σ2
(ln 2)(1+x)
+ 1
ln 2
(
ln (1 + x)− x
1+x
)
, where
x = Pˆk`|h`|2/σ2. Now let f(x) = ln (1 + x)− x1+x . Note that x ≥ 0 in our case as it is a power term. Also note that f(0) = 0
while ∂f(x)
∂x
= x
(1+x)2
≥ 0. Since f(0) = 0 and f(x) is a monotonically increasing function of x, we conclude that f(x) ≥ 0,
and hence vk`(τk`, Pk`) is an increasing function of τk`.
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a) Flag= 0.
b) Calculate τPk` such that ak +  = ukl(Pk`, τ
P
kl),
c) Calculate τSk` such that b` +  = vkl(Pk`, τ
S
kl),
End If
• If⌊
uk`(τk`, P
S
k`)
⌋
δ
≥ ak +  and
⌊
vk`(τk`, P
P
k`)
⌋
δ
≥ b` + 
OR⌊
uk`(τ
S
k`, Pk`)
⌋
δ
≥ ak +  and
⌊
vk`(τ
P
k`, Pk`)
⌋
δ
≥ b` + 
Then Ak`(ak + , b` + ) = 1.
End If
2) BLMA2: Aspiration Update
• If Flag= 1,
Choose Pkl uniformly at random in [PPk`, P
S
k`].
Else
Choose τkl uniformly at random in [τSk`, τ
P
k`].
End If
• Update ak ← bukl(Pk`, τkl)cδ,
• Update b` ← bvkl(Pk`, τkl)cδ,
Note that this time, users initialize with arbitrary time and power offers (τkl, Pkl). Agents then
flip a coin. If the outcome is more than one half, they calculate their aspiration based power
levels given the existing time. Otherwise they calculate their aspiration based time request/offer
given the existing power.
Proposition 2: Given uk`(τk`, Pk`) and vk`(τk`, Pk`) with opposing trends in τk` and Pk`, and
 = qδ > 0 for some {q | q > 1 and q ∈ Z}, BLMA2 will converge to an -pairwise stable state
with probability one.
Proof:
The proof proceeds as we did in Proposition 1. The only difference now is that due to the lack
of quasi-convexity, we can no longer connect any line segment between agents’ time and power
offers, and assume that any point in between these two offers will be agreeable. We can, however,
make use of the fact that users have opposing interests. Fixing time, if
⌊
uk`(τk`, P
S
k`)
⌋
δ
≥ ak+ 
and
⌊
vk`(τk`, P
P
k`)
⌋
δ
≥ b` + , then any point on the vertical line connecting PPk` and P Sk` must
be agreeable. A similar statement can be said about choosing any point on the horizontal line
connecting the time offers τPk` and τ
S
k`. Fig. 5 illustrates the process of choosing the match point
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Fig. 5. BLMA2: a) If RAND[0, 1] ≥ 1
2
, PUk and SU` fix the time offer and search for agreements in the power offers, b)
otherwise, PUk and SU` fix the power offer and search for agreeable matches in the time offers.
in BLMA2 for the sample case of the SU utility not being quasi-concave. Once agreement is
established, the proof follows as in Proposition 1.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the BLMA in cognitive radio networks. We
randomly place the PUs and the SUs in a 1×1 square area. We consider large scale fading so that
the channel coefficients are computed as the inverse of the distances between the transmitting
and receiving nodes. The PU transmit power Pk = 0.01 for all PUs and PT` = 1 for all SUs and
σ2 = 1. We also take δ = 0.05 and  = 3δ.
A. Validating Proof technique
In Fig. 6, we plot the performance of the BLMA1 used to solve the matching problem of
Section IV where we assumed quasi-convexity. In this particular figure, we plot the index of
the SU matched to a particular PU and the utilities of the secondary users. Since the market
is unbalanced, there are 3 PUs and 5 SUs, two SUs (SU1 and SU2 in this example) are left
unmatched with aspiration levels zero. This run shows a sample realization that is close to
our proof technique. First, agents’ aspiration levels steadily increase in the so-called pre-stable
phase. This stage happens fast, in about 24 steps. Then agents compete over matches, SU1
and SU2 compete over PU3 while SU4 steadily reduces it aspiration level as it is single. SU4
eventually “wins” at around 1400 steps. Single agents then steadily decrease their aspirations
until -pairwise stability is reached which happens in this realization at around 1800 steps. It
is possible to achieve faster convergence if we use an adaptive δ scheme similar to the one
suggested in [26].
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Fig. 6. Number of negotiation rounds till stable matching occurs for BLMA1 in a 3 PUs × 5 SUs case.
B. A Complete Information Reference Scheme
Next, we contrast our results with the scenario proposed in [14]. As mentioned earlier, the
authors consider two scenarios regarding assumptions about the θk`’s. We will contrast with the
partially incomplete information scenario where PUs know the type of all SUs connected to
them. This is the stronger information assumption in the work of [14]. Once this information is
available, a PU can calculate the SU utility for a given time and power offer. It is in that sense
that we refer to the scheme of [14] as a complete information benchmark since in our work
agents know nothing about the utilities of other users in the network even if the time and power
offers are known.
Fig. 7 shows the resulting PU utility using BLMA1 and the algorithm in [14] denoted as
Feng et al. The algorithm in that work resembles an ascending auction, PUs start with the time
and power offers that give the least utility to SUs, and gradually increase the utility offers to
SUs until the first stable allocation of time and power is reached. It is clear that the first stable
matching occurring using this algorithm is the best from the PUs perspective. Since there is
only one sequence in which events can happen in that algorithm, there is no need to average the
algorithm results for a given channels’ allocation. In our algorithm, on the other hand, the agents
randomly encounter each other and so we average our results over 1000 runs of the algorithm
to account for different ways in which convergence may occur. For both algorithms, we plot the
resulting PUs’ utilities for both cases of a balanced (3 PUs × 3 SUs) case and an unbalanced
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Fig. 7. PUs’ utility using BLMA1 and the perfect information approach in [14] for the case of balanced and unbalanced
markets.
market (3 PUs× 5 SUs). In the case of a balanced market, BLMA1 converges in an average of
1464 rounds and converges in 5338 rounds in the unbalanced case. Convergence takes longer in
unbalanced markets since all singles’ aspiration levels must be zero for stability to occur. The
aglorithm in [14] converges in 1782 rounds.
For this simulation example, whether the market is balanced is irrelevant to the algorithm
in [14] and subsequently there is no difference in the achievable utility in both cases. This is
the case since agents know the types of SUs connected to them. Stability occurs before any
offers can be made to “weak” agents. Due to lack of information about other agents, this is not
the case in our algorithm and we note an appreciable increase in the PUs’ utilities from the
balanced to the unbalanced market case. The performance of BLMA1 in the unbalanced market
case is clearly close to the perfect information scheme of [14]. If we compare with the weaker
information assumption of [14], we expect to find instances when our algorithm performs better
despite the limited information restriction.
C. Biasing the Market towards PU-favored Outcomes
A question remains as to the possibility of modifying the negotiation process so that the
outcome favors one side of the market. As noted in [4], general assignment games with nonlinear
utilities retain the lattice structure which is characteristic of matching markets. This means that
there are PU-favored outcomes, which are the least favored to the SUs, and SU-favored outcomes,
which also are the least favored to the PUs. In between these two extremes are payoff vectors
with varying degree of satisfaction for the users on the two sides of the market [27].
In our model, a PU’s utility increases with power and decreases with time so that the highest
utility values occur at low time offers and large power requests. This means that the matching
most favorable to all PUs will be the one where all time offers are set to zero and all power
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Fig. 8. Average utility attained by each PU using 1D-BLMA and BLMA2 for the 3 PUs × 3 SUs case and the 3 PUs × 4
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requests set to the maximum possible value per the SUs’ energy constraints. This, however,
would require a complete information scenario since the maximum possible power value is an
SU’s private information13. Furthermore, the SUs would, naturally, be reluctant to share such
information given that it will yield zero secondary utility.
We propose a simple solution: Fix all PU time offers to a specified small value. The rationale
is that choosing small time offers will automatically focus the matching outcome towards PU-
favored matchings. Intuitively, this proposed technique will simply be a special case of BLMA2,
i.e. only search the power domain for agreements while fixing the time offers/requests to small
values. However, for comparison purposes, we will call this realization 1D-BLMA.
In Fig. 8, we compare the performance of BLMA2 and 1D-BLMA in terms of the achievable
utility for PUs and SUs in both a balanced and an unbalanced market. It is clear that implement-
ing the 1D-BLMA in both the balanced and unbalanced market cases substantially increases
the utility of PUs. Furthermore, an unbalanced market with more SUs than PUs provides an
advantage for PUs since it increases the competition among SUs to win matches.
1D-BLMA also provides a faster way to implement the BLMA since the search space is
reduced, now users only have to search for power values. This is evident in Table I which shows
the average convergence times for the 1D-BLMA and BLMA2 for the case considered in Fig.
8.
VII. CONCLUSION
We considered a context-free matching problem defined by agents’ agreement functions. We
defined a notion of pairwise stability called -pairwise stability as the equilibrium concept in
13If such information were available, then there are many techniques, as discussed in [14] for the PUs to reach a stable
matching
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BLMA2 1D-BLMA
Balanced Market Unbalanced Market Balanced Market Unbalanced Market
Average Convergence Time (rounds) 114 315 48 85
TABLE I. AVERAGE CONVERGENCE TIME FOR THE SIMULATION CASE OF FIG. 8.
our model. We proposed an abstract algorithm, BLMA, to pair agents in this generic two-sided
market without specifying detailed negotiation mechanisms or the actual allocation of utilities
among users. The BLMA was shown to converge to -pairwise stable solutions with probability
one.
Next, we considered the application of the BLMA to a cooperative relaying scheme in cognitive
radio networks. Within this framework, we provided two examples of cognitive networks where
users have quasi-linear utilities and more general utility forms. For the quasi-linear utility case,
we showed a procedure for the BLMA, BLMA1, that exploits users’ convex level sets to obtain
stable solutions. For the case of non-linear utilities that still retained users’ opposed interests
in the optimization variables, we provided another procedure, BLMA2, to specify a negotiation
mechanism and a way to update users’ aspirations without the need for quasi-convexity. We
also proposed a simple technique, 1D-BLMA, to bias the matching outcome towards one side
of the market, the PUs’ side in our case. In all such applications of the BLMA to cognitive
networks, we stipulated a minimum information exchange so that users could only calculate
their utilities, but no information is available about the utilities of other users in the network.
Comparing with the stronger information assumptions of previous work in the literature, we
showed the application of BLMA in cognitive radios can achieve close-to-optimal performance
despite the information limitation. Furthermore, we note that our approach does not preclude the
possibility of adding some structure to the algorithm realizations, for practical implementation
and for improved convergence. For example, PUs maybe activated in a round-robin fashion or
the δ step reduction in aspirations can be made adaptive as the algorithm progresses. In all
such case, our results will still follow as long as we can guarantee that agents have a positive
probability of making a match if it exists.
In the end, the BLMA process is simple. Agents with agreeable functions, match with positive
probability, otherwise, they lower their aspirations by a small step and wait for their next random
activation round. We conclude that these proposed simple dynamics of BLMA can be extended
to any such setting where users can be separated into two disjoint sets with opposed interests.
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